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Barbara Herman’s Moral Literacy – The Best Kant EVER.
This is a remarkable book: remarkably impressive, remarkably subtle and imaginative, remarkably wide
ranging in subject matter, and some of the time at least, remarkably maddening too. A modest, almost
slender looking volume, it reveals itself to be, for the reader, as dense as plutonium. Barbara Herman is
surely one of the most ambitious philosophers in moral theory today, and she pursues each of her many
ambitions with a combination of good cheer and ferocity that cannot help but leave some readers panting
and a bit out of breath. Like a drill sergeant in much better shape than you are who prefers not to dwell
on this point lest you lose your motivation even sooner, Herman lays out arguments of great
sophistication throughout Moral Literacy briskly and tirelessly. At the same time, we are never far from
something else entirely: a kind of conversational intelligence that is unashamed to take up and be smart
about the everyday. This has its risks. Sometimes Herman can sound like an affirmative action officer
advising you on how to interview. Sometimes you cannot see where in blazes she gets the confidence to
say the things she does. But on the whole, this is really the product of what is not only a first rate mind
but a first rate sensibility.
So what is going on in Moral Literacy? Well, at least the following. Herman argues for a much
more nuanced and character sensitive picture of Kant, one that not just accommodates but generates
a distinctive set of (Kantian) virtues. She wants to argue for a very different picture than is usually
in place of how we think of the conflict between desires and duty, not just in Kant, but generally,
and connected to this, she wants to argue for a more nuanced and integrated conception of
deliberation than the one she thinks dominates present day philosophy. She wants to argue that
certain Kantian notions such as the idea of the Kingdom of Ends, usually thought of as hopelessly
insular, as too tied to distinctively Kantian themes, actually have a great deal to offer us when
thinking about moral pluralism and the tolerance of others. At the center of the book is a distinctive,
very interesting idea of her own, that of “moral literacy,” which is developed with great skill, and it
offers, she thinks, a very useful way to think about moral agency and what it is to be responsible in
the face of our own limitations and moral change. The topic of “moral change,” the way history
will generate new moral facts, is a subject of great importance to Herman as well. She thinks that
moral change, moral pluralism, and what it is to be responsive to these things, is one of the great
challenges of contemporary moral life, and she says a great deal about what it is to show sensitivity
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to difference that in turn could not be more sensitive. She has a very impressive chapter on
Frankfurt and the will, credibly criticizing Frankfurt for being insufficiently responsive to the idea
of objective value in his conception of the self. She has some interesting things to say about
benevolence, and what it is we really should be worried about when we worry about others
(autonomy, not welfare – which makes integrating this concern into our moral life elsewhere
easier). Finally, as if all this were not enough, she is interested in the degree to which moral
assessment has a place even within the demands of rough and tumble pragmatic politics, and she
pursues this issue with a close look at the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in South Africa.
Clearly, I cannot take up and assess each of these projects, nor do I think would any reader really
want me to. I mention this list – and one could probably, easily, add more to it –simply to give the
reader some idea of the breadth and scope this book, and so the breadth and scope of Herman’s
abilities. In this review I will confine myself to taking up the following themes: the Kantian account
of character and deliberation Herman likes, her account of moral literacy, and the challenges
liberalism, and moral agents generally, face in light of moral change and the demands of a
pluralistic society.
Kantian Character, Kantian Deliberation
Whatever else Herman wants to do in Moral Literacy, she very much wants to challenge our overall
sense of Kant. The familiar Kant, the Kant of harsh dualities – between say reason and desire, or
between dispositions of character, and an abstract capacity to do the right thing “for its own sake” –
is very much to be set aside. If we read Kant sympathetically, and in ways that are also driven by a
kind of independent responsiveness to moral life, we wind up with a very different Kant than the
one most of us routinely put forward to our students in our introduction to philosophy courses.
The key to getting Kant right, Herman thinks, is getting the right account of desires and motives,
and so of deliberation generally, to begin with. Desires may of course start, in infancy, as more or
less how the Humean might describe them, as brute affective states, outside the evaluative world,
the subject of (later) evaluative response. But moral development is best thought of as a process in
which desires are shaped by the values they achieve, or fail to achieve, through experience and
reflection. As Herman nicely notes, once this process has been in place for any length of time at all,
objects of desire will have morally salient qualities attached to them from the start – they are before
us as “these sorts of things,” with this sort of moral stature, to begin with. We see, if we have been
brought up at all well, sports cars and tennis rackets as owned, as not available for our taking.
When, as treasurer, I do not pocket the funds of the PTA, it is not, as Herman notes, because I am
not aware of the advantages of having the money; it is because I do not see these funds as in fact
available. (22)
These are of course fairly transpersonal examples, but the point is easily extended to the desires that
arise within our personal life too. Our connections to our friends and family, and so the various
desires we have regarding them, are saturated with a kind of moral or evaluative status, perhaps not
“from the start” but certainly after reflection, after some time. Conversely, responsiveness to the
abstract principles of morality weaves in and out the very fabric of our personal connections too. “If
I cannot attend to a friend because of the demands of some prior obligation, I need not view myself
as subordinating friendship to morality, or as valuing friendship less, or differently. The way
morality may make demands is part of the structure of a mature friendship; it is why we have
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/ross2rev.html[9/18/2009 5:09:35 PM]
reason to believe a true friend will understand.” (22) A recurring theme throughout Moral Literacy
is that before all else, we must have the right account of desires, which is to say, the right account
of the objects that we want, the right account of how such objects present themselves to us – at least
if our development has gone at all reasonably well. And, when we have this account, then it clearly
becomes a mistake to think of our attraction to various objects as something that occurs in some
brute way, the way say hunger certainly does, quite apart from morality, or outside of morality, that
we then “turn to” morality to “regulate.” I think there is no thesis Herman is more anxious to
discredit than this one, and the alternative view she favors is crucial not just to her view of Kant
but to her view of moral life generally. Deliberation, Herman argues, occurs within a “deliberative
field” in which objects of interest or desire for us have different degrees, or different kinds, of
“moral salience” to begin with. When we see the deliberation this way, when we see the content of
our desires as shaped by rational morality, then the “conflict” between “self interest” and “morality”
looks very different from how it is usually presented as being.
Of course, I said “when the development has gone at all reasonably well.” But this is just to say:
Kantian theory can, and should, take the improvement, the addition, that is undeniably there to be
taken from more character driven moral theories, such as that of Aristotle. As Herman puts it “the
pressures on Kantian moral theory arising from the challenges of virtue theorists have been entirely
salutary.” (28) There is no reason in the world that the Kantian cannot “make room for character”
(to use the title of Herman’s first chapter). And so the Kantian too can (now) speak of the right or
reasonably responsive upbringing, the formation of the right habits – why not? But the Kantian does
all this, speaks of character formation and having the right desires, without abandoning the
“primacy of the rational principle.” The Herman-Kantian-virtue-story is one in which what gets
formed is a kind of attentiveness to others as rational, autonomous agents, attunement to the way
certain institutions (e.g. property) can reflect a kind of respect for persons and their autonomy, and
so forth. The best response to the unsatisfactory dichotomies inherited from Hume, the contrast
between desire and reason, and so by extension, between desire and moral authority, dichotomies
continually rehearsed in contemporary philosophy, is the right blend of Aristotle and Kant. But
when we see Kantian principles as rightly guiding moral development, we also get the most
satisfactory account of how the content of these developed desires have for us the right sort of
authority.
[I]f the motive of duty is not merely something enters into a balance of reasons but is
instead part of the structure of the agent’s reasons in general, not only will the account
of moral reasons look different, so does the account of self interest. The fully rational
motive of self interest does not carry a presumption of independent authority in the
agent’s deliberative field. It is not that the moral agent ignores her interests or her
advantage. Rather her conception of self interest has developed, been shaped or altered,
in a reason-responsive way. That is why some interests of a self can rebut a moral
presumption: it may be permissible to break a trivial promise for matters of great
personal importance, but only if the agent’s concerns have and are conceived of as
having moral standing. (23)
This theme recurs throughout Moral Literacy. Don’t see the desires of the self as somehow at war
with morality; don’t see morality as somehow alien to or set against the things we love. And
further, perhaps for some surprisingly, it turns out to be the Kantian, and the repertoire of ideas that
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the Kantian has at his disposal, that can effect this reconciliation best. Caring about others, caring
about ourselves, is all best made sense of within the Kantian conception in which the desires we
have are characterized as responsive to that which really does have value: autonomous members of
the Kingdom of Ends, the happiness of others, or our own perfection. We have, with Kant, and only
with Kant, the account of objective value that actually makes the best sense of our personal
passions.
Once this orientation is before us, it is perhaps no surprise that it is then filled out with close
attention to the circumstances of moral development, for us, now, in a modern, changing,
sometimes confusing, pluralistic world. After all, if character development is important, if the right
desires or dispositions and the like are important, let us then turn to the account of moral
development that is not only congruent with Kantian ideals, but is attuned to the actual facts of the
world as we presently know it. This Herman does, and I will turn to this feature of Herman’s
argument directly. But first a more or less minor comment on the argument so far.
Herman’s approach to the nature of desire and deliberation expresses a kind of idealism or
optimism that I find quite appealing. The central idea is that the values of the world, when properly
attended to, shape our desires in such a way that our subsequent deliberations, while not necessarily
easy or straightforward, are certainly not to be thought of as between morality and “something
else.” When it comes to deliberation, we are like a parent with many children, different in all sorts
of ways, who we love, (of course), deeply and in different ways too – the conflicts we have are an
expression of how well our life has gone, one might say, not some tragic duality. But attractive as
this picture is, and as unsatisfactory as Hume’s final philosophical picture may be, sometimes the
way Hume says it is (sadly) just is right. Sometimes, it really is the case that what we want very
badly is not shaped or integrated into our moral life or moral concerns at all, and this will be so
despite the fact that we have been very well attuned to moral value for some time, and largely
shaped by this fact in our overall development. Obviously (I hope it is “obviously”) people
experience sexual desire this way all the time. I think some of the time the desire to strike out
aggressively has this kind of status too: deeply felt, not for a moment thought of as integrated into
what is valuable or right, and to be utterly opposed whenever it takes root. Sometimes, the role of
morality really just is to deny a desire authority it would easily have otherwise. Impressively,
Herman points over and over again to the ways in which we can have integrated lives. I think she is
absolutely right to hold that we can approach this ideal, and right to chart this approach along the
lines that she does. But whatever else we are, we are also fallen creatures, and while (Kantian)
morality may well be a means by which we can and do achieve deep, almost profound integration
with ourselves, it is no vast mistake of intellectual history that it is also in our philosophical
tradition as a corrective, an antagonist, to those places where this project gives out, and to those
times when we have become, at that moment, just beasts. Still, this is as I say something of a minor
criticism. The conception of desire and deliberation that Herman defends is I think largely plausible
– if not always as a fact, then perhaps as an ideal. And it is interesting to read Herman and reflect
on the way in which a Kantian morality may be the most idealistic morality of them all.
Moral Literacy, Moral Change, and Facing Difference
Let me return, then, to Herman’s argument and take up two related subjects, which also illustrate
how Kant, or at least, with how a contemporary Kantian, might fit in with the concrete moral world
of today. These are: getting the right account of moral development and responsibility, and getting
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the right account of tolerance or sensitivity to moral difference and moral change.
On the subject of agency, Herman gives herself a particularly interesting challenge: how we can
both acknowledge that powerful causal stories form our moral disabilities, (such as habits of cruelty
or psychological abuse when within intimate relationships of character), yet see ourselves (rightly)
as responsible for the actions we do when acting out of these disabilities all the same? It is here that
Herman develops her extremely interesting, original idea of “moral literacy,” which purports to
offer a conception of moral agency that is right for this contingent, limited world, with its
inevitably contingent, limited actors.
Before the challenges of pluralism and difference, we will need a notion of responsiveness on one
hand, but also a criterion or test of acceptability, for not everything we take up, however
sympathetically, will merit endorsement, will deserve a place in the kingdom of ends. And
naturally, both of these projects express a more general one: showing that Kant really can speak to
the hard, local, moral issues of today.
As a threshold matter, Herman argues (quite credibly I think) that we don’t need too much
revisionism to make sense of how the Kantian agent may be located within a concrete social
context. This is in fact explicitly, and straightforwardly, provided for in Kant’s theory through the
role, and the importance, of the agent’s maxim. Our maxims of action provide all the particularity
we could ask for, as they draw from and are informed by local circumstances and local identities.
And the reach this local identity may have in our lives is very hard to exaggerate. “The more
comprehensive the claims of a way of life are, the more pervasive its values will be in agent’s
maxims. Consider the possible diversity of willings involved in child rearing practices, recreation,
conjugal relations and caring for the homeless. Something as ordinary as choices in clothes may be
dictated by slavishness to fashion, whim, religious discipline or cultural identification.”(34) In a
nice aside, Herman wryly notes that commentators tend not only to stereotype Kant on this issue,
but to condemn him or praise him depending on the kind of social fact he is said to stand aloof
from: “One is therefore likely to be drawn to applaud Kantian morality where it rejects hierarchical
or excluding social connections that we abhor, and then condemn it for heavy handedly refusing
moral standing to connection per se, since there are areas, like community or the family where we
find it attractive.”(52) Since we more than amply reflect our particular circumstances in our maxim
formation, the problem cannot be whether Kant can sufficiently “accommodate” local identity; the
problem is going to be whether we can generate good mechanisms to overcome local ways of
thinking when such ways of thinking are parochial or blinding.
This is the challenge Herman will take up explicitly when taking up moral difference, pluralism,
and tolerance. But the worry is everywhere the same, and for the Kantian, the solution, roughly,
must be too. We must ask whether these ways of life, these maxims, these understandings: respect
others as ends in themselves, or pass the categorical test, or treat agents as equal members in a
community of rational agents, and so forth. The fundamental Kantian framework, the fundamental
Kantian argument – empirical material, judged by reference to an impersonal, rational rule – is
consistently deployed. And this brings me to a pervasive feature, and difficulty, in Moral Literacy.
Throughout the work, in every chapter, Herman’s attunement to the contours of everyday moral life
is undeniable. Indeed, one of the pleasures in reading Herman is that you often feel you are
realizing, for the first time, just how subtle such contours in some particular case may be. But such
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sensitivity or attunement is also a bit of a Pandora’s Box for the Kantian argument; very dangerous
once opened. My point is not simply that the characterizations she offers of various phenomena are
not always beyond challenge; this is to be expected. (I find her characterization of pornography
(110 – 113) extremely hyperbolic, for example, and I will take up various other examples,
inevitably, in the discussion below.) My point is that, in seeing that this is so, in seeing that these
normative characterizations of various practices are by no means obvious, or not without plausible
rival, we also have to ask how dependent Herman’s various Kantian applications are upon a kind of
unexamined realism, a sort of intuitionism, regarding moral facts. For me, this is tied to a systemic
vulnerability in Kantian arguments generally. The supreme Kantian values, respecting others via
“following a universal rule of practical reason,” being “reason responsive” in our moral life, being a
creature “capable of initiating action by deriving it from her representations of the will’s own
principle” (171) – and so forth – will all annex and depend heavily on underlying descriptions of
what it is we are doing, or on what it is that is going on, before we turn to and take up this
standpoint. And such descriptions will typically be normative in character, at least to some degree.
This is well known to anyone who has ever taught Kant in a classroom. Is that maxim best
described as a self interested lie, or a justified deception in the service of an ideal? Is that
fundamentalist practice one that respects women, or denigrates them? To Herman’s credit, she never
shies away from wading into hard cases and offering ambitious accounts one way or another, but
she resists acknowledging what follows from her need to do so – the degree to which the Kantian
argument relies on clarity or certainty here. Unlike utilitarianism which can try to circumvent such
difficulties by reference to a (purportedly) neutral evaluative metric, Kantians like Herman must
unabashedly traffic in rich, almost evangelical moral descriptions of the everyday. You see this in
the work of Ronald Dworkin too. For the universalization arguments to work smoothly, the
underlying phenomena put to the test must already bear the right sort of moral character. When
such normative attributions seem unobjectionable, then, undeniably, the Kantian argument goes on
to deliver a conclusion of great power. When that normative attribution is itself subject to
challenge, tracing out the consequences of that characterization in the high language of Kantianism
will add nothing to the argument. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Rawls’ argument has
proven so enduring and so powerful in our intellectual culture today – though Kantian in its
conception of the person, it plays out within a very limited framework, drawing upon very few
descriptions of institutions and features of social life, and the descriptions it offers of these are for
the most part “reasonable,” (to use a favorite word in that argument); to that extent, non-
controversial. The philosopher who would apply Kant to moral life overall cannot limit the subject
matter in this way, and, as I say, to her great credit, Herman has no interest in doing so. She is a
happy warrior, ready to wade in with her sword of description and offer shamelessly normative
characterizations of more or less everything she sees when driving around Los Angeles. (How we
respond to and treat the homeless, cruelty or abuse in intimate relations, insular third world cultures
in the midst of urban America, pornography, black white relations generally, male female relations
in the office – these are the cases she returns to again and again.) The problem is, as I say, simply
that, in so far as one disagrees with the underlying account, or, in so far as there are good reasons
to hold a rival account justified, the subsequent Kantian analysis of the issue, employing those
terms, will fail to advance or resolve the argument.
If this is a problem that every Kantian must face, (or resist), let me now turn then to the themes,
already mentioned, that are distinctive to Herman: the idea of moral literacy, what it is to come to
grips with new moral facts, and how Kantian ideas may guide us when thinking about pluralism and
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tolerance. The degree to which her arguments are vulnerable should there be reasonable
disagreement about the relevant underlying characterization is I think more pointed with respect to
her arguments regarding pluralism and tolerance, as opposed to her theory of moral literacy. But as
a difficulty, I think it is fair to say that it never entirely goes away.
“Moral literacy” is Herman’s term for “a capacity to read and respond to the basic elements of a
moral world”(97) …“a near universally available skill, yet one that cannot be deployed except in a
local idiom.”(79) The idea arises in response to two distinct needs that Herman will bring together.
Herman wants to see whether something like Kant’s idea of a distinctively moral motive can be
made good, given the understandings that seem natural to us when thinking about motive now, in
contemporary philosophy. She also wants to explore how we can make sense of agents bearing
moral responsibility for what they do, given the fact we are all, inevitably, the products of some
contingent moral education story or other, and so equally inevitably, sometimes blind or unable to
do what we should. In one of those terrifically insightful asides that run throughout the book,
Herman notes that Aristotle is both the natural figure in the background here, when taking up this
worry, and in some ways, absolutely the wrong one to follow:
It is not exactly a failing of Aristotelian theory that it lacks elements that render it fit for
the circumstances in which we find ourselves. It is not clear that it was intended in that
sense to provide guidance to contemporary Athenians either. Aristotle’s account of moral
character includes a piece about the social and material setting in which the virtuous
person is to live: a city of modest size with a particular kind of participatory politics, a
generous level of material well being, carefully controlled moral education, and a class
within which a man of good character could experience himself as an equal among
equals...As far as is humanly possible, the morally unexpected is legislated away…[By
contrast] if we are to hold agents morally competent across an extended range of
conditions of action, we do better, at least at the outset, thinking about moral character
and motivation as something that can arise through normal upbringing in quite diverse
circumstances, ones that may include some range of moral deformation, but do not, for
that, undermine our status as responsible agents or our responsibility for what we do. (96
– 97)
Enter the idea of “moral literacy,” a kind of minimal moral ability, the “basic capacity for
recognizing and responding to moral facts,” (93) “an ability to distinguish persons and things that is
responsive to [the] morally basic facts of injury, offense, and so on.” (100) While this will be
illustrated or filled out in particular contexts with particular examples (examples we would not
expect to be fully replicated in every culture), Herman thinks (plausibly) that since this is a
fundamental capacity of persons, it is pretty much available to all. And the important, further move
that this idea of moral literacy makes available to us is this: so long as we think of the agent as
attuned to these most basic facts, anywhere, in any domain of life, then we must see whatever
limits or blindness the agent also has as something which can be morally addressed, and so as
limitations for which the agent is rightly held responsible – which is exactly how we understand the
limits we have in any other domain where we also have a basic competence. Competence at driving
does not of itself make us good drivers. But if we are competent, we try to correct what we do
badly, and are responsible for where we fail. Herman puts it nicely, and pointedly, when she writes:
“We expect that a driver with a blind spot over her right shoulder will over time discover the gap in
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her visual field, appreciate its danger and compensate for it…That the blind spot is a fixed feature
of her visual field gives her a task, not an excuse.” (99) The man who grows up shaped by bad
habits in intimate relationships and as a result of this takes pleasure in humiliation or abusing trust
may not be able to effect a change. But assuming this is someone who does see basic moral facts
elsewhere (and certainly this is usually the case), and who here expresses agency (we set aside the
obsessive), then, again, though he may not be able to change, it is incumbent upon him “to change
the angle of his encounters.” Herman wants to draw us all in to the net of moral effort – what we
do badly, and do badly as a result of some causal story, becomes, as she says, a task, a project, not
something set aside, seen as outside of agency because of some story that speaks of bad “moral
luck.” Competence elsewhere makes us responsible here, even if our failure is the result of a causal
story that began when we were children.
Further, this idea of minimal competence or minimal attunement to basic moral facts tracks the
kernel of truth in the Kantian idea of the distinctively moral motive. Of course, most of us are far
more than merely minimally competent. But all of us, however good, will fail to be responsive from
time to time. Herman argues, plausibly, that the idea of minimal moral competence to see and
respond to basic moral facts serves as a starting point for a more developed moral character and
keeps a distinctive role in that character as a kind of fallback, or backstop, when fatigue or stress or
other crises threaten to derail what is usually, otherwise, straightforward. It is this all of us have,
even when we care very little, or are consistently drawn to the wrong sorts of things; it is this all of
us can fall back on when we are not at our best or even overwhelmed. This, really, is the right way
to repackage Kant’s idea that all of us are capable of acting morally, and that we are responsible
when we fail.
I find this a very interesting proposal, a very interesting approach, and I think Herman is right about
several important things. She is certainly right that we need an account of character development
that is attuned to the ways most of us have our character formed in circumstances far less salutary
than those presumed in the Nicomachean Ethics. And she is right that a causal explanation for a
character defect does not automatically place what we do as a result of that defect beyond the ambit
of moral responsibility. I also like her sensitivity to the fact that being able to do the minimal thing,
being able to pay attention at all, is sometimes, in some circumstances, in fact a very hard thing to
do, and even the most mature personality must have access to this capacity when other interests or
mechanisms fail. But moral luck does not go away entirely. Whether certain habits are seen as
limitations or bits of blindness that require work or resistance is not some always brute fact, bearing
its moral character on its sleeve, but may well instead be a function of the culture, or even the
subculture, in question. A tendency to aggressiveness may be no limitation in a certain sort of cop
doing a certain sort of work, or in a father jealously guarding his daughter’s honor in the Middle
East; the tendency to respect others and listen closely to what they say is annoying for those in the
mafia. Does consent to the limitation of character in question make a difference? At one point,
Herman says that “some desires,” like the desire to posses or sexually dominate, “have no standing
at all.”(44) Suppose the object consents, enjoys it, wants the counterpart thing, what then? I am not
saying consent is a magic wand that, once waved, makes talk of all normative assessment disappear.
But my intuitions on this example at least do go that way – if the parties consent, it is not clear
anyone has to “work” on any “limitation” at all. Can someone accused of having a “limitation” in
one domain simply “fix” the “problem” by emigrating, by going where this quality is, if not a
virtue, at least not one to raise any objections? If, as a policeman in Scarsdale, you are consistently
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accused of being too aggressive (a tendency you have had, of course, since childhood), can you just
join the Special Forces where suddenly, to your delight, no one ever complains? Here again, a kind
of “closet realism” lurks in the background to the argument. The more we find the characterizations
unproblematic, uncontroversial, the more what Herman does with such material is secure, and
impressive. The more it is otherwise, the more it is merely impressive.
Unsurprisingly, Herman’s argument regarding new moral facts will be analogous in some ways to
the one just rehearsed – whatever limitations we may bring, because of our upbringing or our
culture, to the challenges posed by social change and the new facts that such change puts before us,
we nevertheless can, as moral agents, always do at least the minimally right thing. But because in
this case, we are wrestling with the project of handling certain differences in perception between
people, or groups, and figuring out how to treat others, despite these differences, as equals in a
moral community, other issues and concerns are implicated than those that arose when thinking
about character and pathology. Or: what “the minimally right thing” is will have a very different
sort of content here. As always, Herman pays great, close attention to the phenomenon before her,
and her observations about moral change and moral differences in a pluralistic society are well
worth attention in their own right.
Like certain other Kantians, Herman is dissatisfied with a merely pragmatic justification for liberal
tolerance and the liberal state. (Ronald Dworkin in Law’s Empire also comes to mind.) “Tolerance”
between different groups alone is not enough – certainly not enough for Herman – if it is
understood simply in terms of mutual wariness, mere accommodation between otherwise
disinterested parties. Further, this sort of “tolerance” can easily go along with a kind of contempt
that in turn prevents full enfranchisement (this is an undeniable insight: think of the “tolerance”
many would say they have for homosexuals and how quickly such tolerance gives out). The very
word leaves a bad taste for her: “one tolerates what one dislikes or disapproves of” she says. (31) (I
don’t think Herman is right about this: I tolerate Punk music with a kind of easy going affection.)
Herman wants to articulate a different conception, and believes the Kantian idea of the Kingdom of
Ends has a role to play in it. Doing so will also fit with her project of showing that Kant’s concern
with seemingly abstract values, like our rational autonomy, may – indeed must – be filled in with
concrete local content.
And anyway, Herman feels people are right (at least presumptively) to want to see the values they
live by find some place in their civic life too. The typical liberal argument “paid insufficient
attention to the fact that the values governing people’s daily lives are not ones they are willing to
cabin off from decisions that affect the culture in which their lives take place.”(29) Yet, though the
desire to see one’s (local) values in one’s civic culture is understandable, perhaps even reasonable,
and such local values will certainly sometimes clash, we need not assume that all encounters
between incompatible value systems end in “mutual opacity and exclusion.” The idea, and ideal,
Herman favors is two fold. There must be mutual interrogation and engagement, sensitivity, for
example, to the way things like “harm” and “benefit” are often relative to, or rooted in, a particular,
culture and its particular history. (And instead of “culture,” one can equally well here say “race” or
“gender” – her discussions of sexual innuendo in the workplace, or the failure of American history
to come to terms with lynching are excellent examples of this point.) On the other hand, the place
of local values in civic culture must be mediated by certain regulative Kantian requirements. Only if
such local values, or locally rooted claims, can admit of “translation” into suitably “autonomy
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respecting” terms will they have a rightful place in shared public culture. “Local values can support
objective moral judgments only insofar as they are mediated by moral principle (specifically the
categorical imperative).” So we may wish to accommodate the importance of family values in some
local culture, but if “family values” support, in this case, spousal rape, then such local culture fails
the “translation test” and this culture can claim no authority. “Values that cannot accept translation
have no legitimate deliberative place.” (45) Thus a different, less sullen, conception of the tolerant
liberal state is advanced, and we see in this case a nice example of how the specific, the local, on
one hand, and a general Kantian concern for persons as autonomous agents as a regulative principle
over such values on the other, may fruitfully coexist.
Of course, this idea of what does and does not admit of “translation” into Kantian terms is not
always so clear. Some examples are of course intuitive. If respect for the autonomy of others means
anything, spousal rape must be excluded, to be sure. Similarly, there could be many possible
conceptions of property, and all of them could accommodate or advance some conception of rational
agency, but a conception that excluded blacks from being property owners would have to be ruled
out. (43) But once examples like this are set aside, difficulties of application, of clarity, will surely,
and easily, arise (does insisting on the chador respect women? Is it acceptable to withdraw the
Amish child from school at sixteen? Can an African American school seek public funding and
exclude women?), and offering a general conception of “acceptability” seems too much even for
Herman’s formidable powers of description. Here is Herman’s stab at doing so: “A given [local]
institution, - of say property or family life - satisfies this role [of expressing the Kantian idea of
rational agency] if it makes the expression of rational agency possible (for those within the orbit of
the institution) and when the connection to the conditions of rational agency is or can be an
essential part of the cultural understandings of the institution (its structure and requirements).”(44)
The heck you say, Barbara. I wholeheartedly invite the reader to apply this translation test to the
examples in the parenthesis above and tell me the results.
Further, even when a conception does fail, what then? It is not at all clear. Of course, as good
liberals, we will want to prevent spousal rape (if we are lucky enough to have the spouse complain),
but that’s a fairly easy case; a transpersonal harm, dear to liberals everywhere, is at the center of
our concern. Consider by contrast Herman’s own example (very intelligently elaborated) of two
communities demanding local control over education, one because it seeks to preserve its language
and customs, the other because it wants to protect its children from exposure to material that
presents other value systems in a favorable, or even neutral light. (49) The moral values here are
significantly different: seeking partial separation from a dominant community is fine, unthreatening,
but the values of the second community promote “parochial intolerance” and so “does not carry
moral weight.” I applaud Herman for the example and for the frankness (and truth) of her judgment.
But as I say: exactly what follows? Perhaps this is a good reason to deny such a community control
over public funded education, but we cannot prevent them from withdrawing from the public funded
world and pursuing these “intolerable” values in private school. With enough oil money in the
background, what is the difference? The intolerable goes forward exactly as if it were otherwise.
And connected to these last two points, I must also make another. Of course, throughout this
review, I have been anxious to point out that, to the extent the underlying normative
characterizations are not obvious, various aspects of Herman’s Kantian project will run into
difficulty. But here, to some extent motivated by my discussion of the last example, I want to make
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this point against Herman in a more threshold way, and quibble a bit with her characterization of
the difficulty her Kantian approach to liberalism is supposed to solve. It is not obvious to me that
mutual disinterest is always so bad, or that engagement is always so nice. I really just don’t want to
engage with the Evangelicals. I really don’t want to talk to them. I really don’t want to understand a
myriad of other beliefs either, and the beauty of the liberal state, as I understand it, is that I don’t
have to, and need not. My hunch is that those on the other side of this fence feel just fine about this
too. Herman offers us a definite alternative political vision, and it really could not be elaborated
upon with greater sensitivity or intelligence. (Nor sometimes, it must be said, with any greater
vagueness either.) But it is not clear to me that the “problem” she addresses, here, is really a
problem to begin with. It is for some, to be sure – those with Kantian ideals. But I do not think
there is some neutral account of the liberal state that will unambiguously endorse her view of it, as a
failure, or as incomplete unless altered in this way, as opposed to my view of it (or Mill’s). And so
I do not think this characterization of hers in fact captures how it actually feels for many either.
I have made several criticisms here, and so it seems only right that I conclude by taking up a sub-
theme in Moral Literacy I found particularly impressive. When cultures change or when cultures
become deeply pluralistic, inherited habits may lead us astray. What was once innocuous or even
charming may have now become condescending, or insensitive. Pluralism, or the belated expression
of long held grievances, may make it not enough that we be “sincere.” The coach who continues to
use stereotypical expressions at practice is sincerely interested in his African American athletes; the
boss who keeps the Playboy calendar on the wall sincerely thinks of himself as a good boss and
good man. As Herman notes, in an ethnically homogeneous world, where stable background
institutions usually insure against misunderstanding, sincerity and “good intentions” would probably
almost always be enough. For us, it is otherwise, and we must be alive to the possibility that our
maxims – as we formulate them to ourselves – do not constitute the final word. That our actions
may not in fact be benign despite our meaning well is just a possibility we must be alive to, now,
in this complex world we live in. And this then becomes a deep part of what it is to respect others,
to attempt to include others in one’s moral concern. I find this a terrific, undeniable and very deep
point, the sort philosophers are often the last to see.
As I hope I have made clear by the various things I have said, and the various tones of voice I
cannot help but take on when saying them, this is indeed an unusual, special work, and Herman
has, I think, a very original and impressive philosophical sensibility. Very ambitious, not always
transparent, it is distinguished by its relentless and largely credible attempt to make Kant’s
argument as rich and as good as possible, and by its consistent intelligence about everyday moral
life. If it fails to own up to where it is driven by ideals rather than facts, this is, in the end, a
forgivable limitation in the insufficiently pluralistic philosophical world of today.
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